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UNITED STATES v. MORISON: A
THREAT TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO PUBLISH NATIONAL
SECURITY INFORMATION
DAVID H. ToPOL*
"A popular Government, without popular information, or the means
of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps
both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who
mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power
which knowledge gives."-James Madison1
The Supreme Court 2 and First Amendment scholars3 frequently
have articulated the importance of a well-informed public. Support for
a broad First Amendment, however, begins to evaporate at the men-
tion of the words national security. Many of the same justices and aca-
demics who support a virtually absolute right of access to, and publica-
tion of, information in most contexts are quick to point out that their
reasoning should not apply to situations in which disclosure might
jeopardize national survival.
4
This Note argues that the First Amendment should be given
greater weight when it is balanced against national security claims of
secrecy. The status quo creates a strong presumption in favor of se-
crecy that should be altered to create a presumption in favor of open-
ness. Indeed, by increasing public dissemination of national security
* B.A. 1988, Cornell University; J.D. 1992, Yale Law School. The author wishes to
thank Doug Fraleigh, Burke Marshall, and Pam Stepp for their help in developing this
idea.
1. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (plurality) (quoting 9 WRIT-
INGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910)).
2. E.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 30 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940).
3. E.g., ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1920); ALEX-
ANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE
(1965); Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521.
4. James A. Goldston et al., Comment, A Nation Less Secure: Diminished Public
Access to Information, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 409, 440-43 (1986); see, e.g., Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 849 & n.* (1978) (Stewart, J., concur-
ring); THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 58-59 (1970).
1
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information, the nation actually may be made more secure.5
Part I examines two of the areas in which national security secrecy
clashes with the First Amendment interest in openness: The right of
access to national security information s and the prosecution of the me-
dia for publication of classified documents. Part II analyzes this clash
and concludes that the status quo tilts too far in the direction of se-
crecy. Part III analyzes how First Amendment theory can provide a
solution to this clash. Part IV offers specific proposals for reform that
are consistent with this analysis.
I. THE CURRENT SysTEM: DENYING ACCESS AND THREATENING
PROSECUTION
The executive branch can attempt to prevent the disclosure of na-
tional security information in two different ways. First, it can use clas-
sification procedures to deny journalists access to specific information.
If that option fails, as a result of leaks or inadequate security proce-
dures, and information does manage to reach the media, the govern-
ment can attempt to prosecute the press for violating statutes that re-
strict publication of national security information.7 These two tools
combine to give the executive branch enormous control over press, and
consequently public, access to what our government is doing in the
field of national security.
A. Using Classification to Deny Access
1. The Statutes
The current system of access and classification of national security
information is governed by the Freedom of Information Act8 (FOIA)
5. Goldston, supra note 4, at 449-56.
6. For a discussion of the theory behind this implied right, see id. at 444.49.
7. This Note does not examine a third important area: The issue of publication by
government employees. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam);
United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
The right of government employees to publish national security information par-
tially overlaps with the issue of overclassification, which is dealt with in this Note, be-
cause broader employee rights would increase the amount of information that could
reach the public domain. However, that issue also involves separate considerations, such
as the validity of employment contracts that waive an individual's First Amendment
rights by requiring prepublication review. Moreover, even if the status quo unduly re-
stricts access to information, it does not follow that government employees should there-
fore be given unlimited rights to violate those rules.
8. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
[Vol. 43
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and Executive Order 12,3569 and strongly favors secrecy. Congress en-
acted FOIA in 196610 to increase public access to government informa-
tion, and although the law provides for broad public access to a great
deal of government information, it also contains nine exemptions.1
The first of these exemptions effectively eliminates access to national
security information under FOIA by providing that any information
the Executive chooses to keep "secret in the interest of national de-
fense or foreign policy" is not subject to the FOIA disclosure provi-
sions. 1 2 The statute delegates to the executive branch the decision of
what information should be classified and remain secret.
In 1982 President Reagan implemented Executive Order 12,356,
the current executive order that applies to the exemption in the inter-
est of national defense or foreign policy. The order creates three levels
of classification: Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential,'13 and the level of
classification given to a particular document depends on whether dis-
closure would be expected to cause "exceptionally grave damage," "se-
rious damage," or "damage" to national security.
14
An examination of the current use of classification procedures
reveals the broad scope of the administration's authority in this area.
In 1988 government agencies classified 2,508,693 documents. 5 The
agencies labeled one percent "Top Secret" and thirty-one percent "Se-
cret."'" 6,654 individuals have authority to classify information.17 In
1988 the Department of Defense classified 85.4% of the information,
the CIA classified 3.1%, and the State Department classified 8.3%. 18
Indeed, Executive Order 12,356 specifically authorizes overclassifi-
cation: "If there is a reasonable doubt about the need to classify infor-
mation, it shall be safeguarded. . .. If there is reasonable doubt about
the appropriate level of classification, it shall be safeguarded at the
9. Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1983), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401
(1988) [hereinafter Exec. Order].
10. Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 552, 80 Stat. 378, 383 (current ver-
sion at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988)).
11. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (1988).
12. Id. § 552(b)(1)(A). The third exemption also is relevant. It provides an excep-
tion for information "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute ... provided that
such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner
as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withhold-
ing or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld." Id. § 552(b)(3).
13. Exec. Order, supra note 9, § 1.1.
14. Id. § 1.1(a)(1)-(3).
15. INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE, 1988 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESI-
DENT 6 (1989).
16. Id. at 7.
17. Id. at 5.
18. Id. at 7 exhibit 5.
1992]
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higher level of classification .... ."1 Although the provision requires
that the appropriate government agency review an overclassification
decision within thirty days,20 "[tjhe message to officials will be clear:
When in doubt, classify.
2 1
Executive Order 12,356 also eliminates any balancing of First
Amendment interests with national security interests.22 Classifiers are
not instructed to take into account whether a particular piece of infor-
mation would be beneficial to the public's right to know. Instead, once
the government identifies a national security justification, it may clas-
sify the information and automatically remove it from public or media
access even if the risk posed by disclosure is minimal.
Consequently, "[b]ecause the executive branch both establishes
the criteria for classification and performs the actual classification of
such information, the FOIA national security exception is not so much
an exemption as it is a license to withhold. '2 Indeed, the Executive
even appoints the staff of the Information Security Oversight Office,
which implements and monitors the classification procedures. 24 Con-
gress, through FOIA's first exemption, therefore delegated all classifi-
cation decisions to the executive branch2 5 and created a system in
which the goal of public access, which led to the creation of FOIA, does
not apply in the national security context.
2. The Role of the Courts
Although judicial oversight would appear to offer a potential check
on overclassification, the courts have refused to exercise such oversight.
FOIA allows citizens to challenge a denial of a request for information
in federal court, and "[uln such a case the court shall determine the
matter de novo, and may examine" the records and affidavits, in cam-
era if necessary, to determine if the decision to withhold falls within
19. Exec. Order, supra note 9, § 1.1(c).
20. Id.
21. Executive Order on Security Classification: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of
the House Comm. on Government Operations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982) (statement
of Mary M. Cheh, Law Professor, George Washington University) [hereinafter Hear-
ings]; accord id. at 50 (statement of Dr. Morton H. Halperin, Center for National Secur-
ity Studies); id. at 88 (statement of Charles S. Rowe, American Newspaper Publishers
Association); id. at 98 (statement of Bob Schieffer, CBS News).
22. Id. at 50 (statement of Dr. Morton H. Halperin); id. at 87 (statement of Charles
S. Rowe).
23. Mary M. Cheh, Judicial Supervision of Executive Secrecy: Rethinking Free-
dom of Expression for Government Employees and the Public Right of Access to Gov-
ernment Information, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 690, 690-91 (1984) (footnote omitted).
24. Exec. Order, supra note 9, § 5.2(a).
25. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1988).
[Vol. 43
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one of the nine exemptions of FOIA.2 8 Nevertheless, courts consistently
have deferred to the judgment of government agencies when the na-
tional security exemption is raised.
2
7
In EPA v. Mink,2 8 for example, members of Congress sued the En-
vironmental Protection Agency under FOIA to obtain documents con-
cerning underground nuclear testing. The Court held that when the
Executive invokes the first exemption of FOIA, no citizen can chal-
lenge the classification decision. Rather, "the test [i]s to be simply
whether the President has determined by Executive Order that partic-
ular documents are to be kept secret. '29 The court reasoned that de
novo review was only for the purpose of determining whether the gov-
ernment actually had classified a particular piece of information pursu-
ant to an executive order, not for determining the legitimacy of a par-
ticular classification. The Court explained that Congress could have
tightened the rules if it had intended to do so,30 but because FOIA
allows an executive order to control the classification of documents, the
courts should give strong deference to all executive decisions in the
area.
31
The Court adopted similar reasoning in CIA v. Sims, 32 which in-
volved a private citizen's suit to compel a FOIA disclosure of the
names of researchers and institutions participating in a CIA project.
The CIA asserted the defense of section 102(d)(3) of the National Se-
curity Act of 1947. 3 Congress incorporated this exemption, which pro-
tects intelligence sources, into the third exemption of FOIA . 3 As in
Mink, the Court stated that the courts should not evaluate the merits
of national security classifications. "[lit is the responsibility of the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence, not that of the judiciary, to weigh the
variety of complex and subtle factors" in determining what constitutes
proper classification.3 5 Yet as Justice Marshall's concurring opinion
recognized, the decision created a "boundless" class of information
that the Court would not examine to determine the appropriateness of
the classification.3
26. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B).
27. Patricia M. Wald, Two Unsolved Constitutional Problems, 49 U. PiTT. L. REV.
753, 760-61 (1988).
28. 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
29. Id. at 82.
30. See id. at 83-84.
31. Id. at 82-84.
32. 471 U.S. 159 (1985).
33. Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 498.
34. Sims, 471 U.S. at 168-73 (construing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)).
35. Id. at 180.
36. Id. at 191 (Marshall, J., concurring).
1992]
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It is apparent that Congress and the judiciary have withdrawn
from the process of classifying national security information. Conse-
quently, the executive branch has carte blanche in this area.37 Profes-
sors Edgar and Schmidt recognized the danger of this abdication of
responsibility in a 1986 article in which they noted that good reason
exists "to doubt the wisdom of allowing the fox to define the parame-
ters of-not to mention guard-the chicken coop. ' 38
B. Creating the Threat of Prosecution to Deter Publication
Not surprisingly, the government cannot control all of the more
than two million pieces of information that it classifies every year. Va-
rious agencies and individuals frequently leak classified information to
the media both to support and to oppose administration policies. 3 9 In
addition, sometimes the government classifies information that already
exists in the public domain.4 0 Nevertheless, once classified information
has reached the media, the government has statutory authorization to
prosecute the media for violating national security statutes. Although
the government rarely uses these statutes, there is increasing interest
in the possibility of such prosecutions.
1. New York Times Co. v. United States: Opening the Door
The 1971 case of New York Times Co. v. United States41 initially
seemed to vindicate the media's right to publish national security in-
formation when the Court held that the government had not met its
burden of justifying the need for a prior restraint to block publication
of the Pentagon Papers.4 2 The decision was an immediate victory for
the press because it permitted publication of classified material despite
the government's claim that publication "'could clearly result in great
harm to the nation.' ,43
Six of the nine Justices suggested, however, that the government
might be able to prosecute the New York Times and the Washington
37. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 110 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
38. Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Curtiss-Wright Comes Home: Execu-
tive Power and National Security Secrecy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 349, 354 (1986).
39. See infra text accompanying notes 130, 136-39.
40. See infra notes 111-26 and accompanying text.
41. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (6-3 decision) (per curiam).
42. Id. at 714.
43. Id. at 762 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Washington
Post Co., 446 F.2d 1327, 1330 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) (Wilkey, J., dissenting), aff'd sub
norn. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)).
[Vol. 43
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Post for violating the Espionage Act,44 even if the government could
not enjoin the publication of the Pentagon Papers. Justice White,
joined by Justice Stewart, said in a concurring opinion that he "would
have no difficulty in sustaining convictions under [the Espionage Act]
on facts that would not justify the intervention of equity and the impo-
sition of a prior restraint. '45 Justice Marshall's concurrence noted that
several statutes permit subsequent prosecution for publication, but
that no congressional authorization existed for issuing a prior re-
straint.46 The combination of these three opinions with the three dis-
senting Justices, who were willing to issue the injunction, meant that a
majority of the Court had "volunteered readings of the espionage stat-
utes in relation to hypothetical criminal proceedings against the pub-
lishers, reporters and information sources involved, even though such
questions had not been briefed, were dreadfully difficult, and were
quite unnecessary to a ruling about the injunction.
'
41
The Court primarily based its decision in favor of the press on two
factors. First, no statutory authorization empowered the government to
seek a prior restraint.48 Second, the Court created a strong presump-
tion against prior restraints on publication and held that the govern-
ment did not prove enough of a risk to national security to overcome
that presumption.49 Thus, the Court did not say that the media is free
from restrictions on publishing national security information during
44. 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) is the most applicable statute and is the one that Justice
White cited. New York Times, 403 U.S. at 737 (White, J., concurring). The section reads:
Whoever having unauthorized possession of, access to, or control over any
document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic
negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating
to the national defense, or information relating to the national defense which
information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of
the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communi-
cates, delivers, transmits or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmit-
ted, or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be communi-
cated, delivered, or transmitted the same to any person not entitled to receive
it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it to the officer or employee
of the United States entitled to receive it ..
18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (1988).
45. New York Times, 403 U.S. at 737 (White, J., concurring). Justice White also
wrote that 18 U.S.C. §§ 797-798 could apply. Id. at 735-37.
46. Id. at 743-48 (Marshall, J., concurring).
47. Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 38, at 361 (footnote omitted).
48. See New York Times, 403 U.S. at 718 (Black, J., concurring); see also, Blasi,
supra note 3, at 644 & n.403 (noting that no general criminal act e:ists that covers
disclosure).
49. New York Times, 403 U.S. at 725-27 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that
only proof that publication would jeopardize safety during time of war overrides the
First Amendment's absolute bar of prior judicial restraints). In fact, this second rationale
was the starting point of the Court's analysis. Id. at 714.
1992]
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peace time. Instead, the Court said that in this particular case the facts
did not warrant issuing an injunction. If instead the executive branch
had sought criminal prosecution and had congressional authorization
to do so, it probably could prosecute without violating the First
Amendment.
Indeed, after losing New York Times, the government took the
Court's advice and attempted to prosecute Daniel Ellsberg and
Anthony Russo for their role in disclosing the Pentagon Papers to the
New York Times.50 A lower court dismissed the case, though, because
of extreme governmental misconduct, "including the suppression of ev-
idence, the invasion of the physician-patient relationship, the illegal
wiretapping, the destruction of relevant documents and disobedience
to judicial orders."' 1 Consequently, the judge did not rule on the First
Amendment issue of whether the government could prosecute the press
for publishing classified materials.
Professor Nimmer contended at the time that "[tihe specter of
Ellsberg hangs over government officials, newsmen, and others who
may in the future wish to disclose to the public vital governmental doc-
uments,"' 2 At the very least, the Pentagon Papers case and subsequent
prosecution of Ellsberg and Russo left two questions unanswered.
First, would the Espionage Act permit the prosecution of a member of
the media? Second, would a more narrowly constructed statute permit
such a prosecution even if the Espionage Act did not?
2. United States v. Progressive, Inc.: Prosecuting the Press for
Violating Specific Statutes
Pursuant to the third exemption of FOIA,53 the government also
may exempt from disclosure any information specifically exempted
from disclosure by another statute. In United States v. Progressive,
Inc.54 the government sought a preliminary injunction against the Pro-
gressive to prevent the magazine from publishing the formula for
building an atomic bomb.5 5 The court issued the preliminary injunc-
tion because the article contained classified information 56 under sec-
50. United States v. Russo, No. 9373-(WMB)-(1)-(filed Dec. 29, 1971), dismissed
(C.D. Cal. May 11, 1973).
51. Melville B. Nimmer, National Security Secrets v. Free Speech: The Issues
Left Undecided in the Ellsberg Case, 26 STAN. L. REv. 311, 311 (1974).
52. Id. at 312.
53. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1988).
54. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.) (mer.), dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979).
55. Id. at 991.
56. Progressive, 467 F. Supp. at 1000.
[Vol. 43
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tion 2274(b) of the Atomic Energy Act.5 7
After obtaining an injunction from a federal district court, the
government was preparing to argue the appeal by the magazine when
once again outside factors prevented a full resolution of the legal issues
involved. Another magazine published the same information before the
Seventh Circuit could hear the appeal and the issue became moot.0 8
It is unfortunate that the issue was not heard on appeal because
Progressive presented a much better test case for evaluating prosecu-
tions of the media than New York Times or the Ellsberg and Russo
prosecutions. In Progressive a congressionally enacted statute author-
ized the government's request for a prior restraint.5 9 Moreover, the
possible danger to national security also appeared much more compel-
ling. In New York Times the court dealt with the publication of mater-
ials concerning events that were at least three years old, but in Pro-
gressive "[a] mistake in ruling against the United States could [have]
pave[d] the way for thermonuclear annihilation." 60 Thus, while in New
York Times the government's motivation for blocking the publication
of the Pentagon Papers might have been to avoid political embarrass-
ment, in Progressive the government's sole purpose appeared to be to
prevent the widespread availability of atomic technology.
In 1982 Congress enacted the Intelligence Identities Protection
Act. 1 Like the provision of the Atomic Energy Act covering publica-
tion, Congress drafted this law much more narrowly than the Espio-
nage Act. The Intelligence Identities Protection Act was a response to
the actions of Philip Agee and Louis Wolf, who published the names of
CIA agents in their magazines CounterSpy and Covert Action Infor-
mation Bulletin.2 On its surface the Act also appears much more rea-
sonable than the government's claim in New York Times. Publication
of CIA agents' names could put their lives as well as the United States
national security in jeopardy. There certainly would seem to be a much
more compelling First Amendment interest in understanding why the
United States became involved in the Vietnam War than in knowing
the names of our spies.8 3 Nonetheless, the government has never in-
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2274(b) (1988).
58. Laura J. Holland, Note, Private International Broadcasting from the United
States: Toward an Understanding of a Content Standard, 18 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 105, 129-30 (1987).
59. Stanley Godofsky & Howard M. Rogatnick, Prior Restraints: The Pentagon
Papers Case Revisited, 18 CuMB. L. REv. 527, 541 n.63 (1988).
60. Progressive, 467 F. Supp. at 996.
61. Pub. L. No. 97-200, 96 Stat. 122 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 421-426 (1988)).
62. Robert W. Bivens, Note, Silencing the Name Droppers: The Intelligence Iden-
tities Protection Act of 1982, 36 U. FLA. L. REv. 841, 843-44 (1984).
63. Later, this Note contends that this point may not always be true. See infra
19921
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dicted a person for a violation of the Intelligence Identities Protection
Act.
3. United States v. Morison64: The First Media Related Conviction
for Violating the Espionage Act
The 1988 conviction of Samuel Morison for violating sections
793(d) and (e) of the Espionage Act 5 marked the first successful prose-
cution for a violation of the Act that involved the media. The only
other attempt by the government to prosecute members of the media
under the Act was the unsuccessful prosecutions of Ellsberg and Russo
for publication of the Pentagon Papers. Previously, all other prosecu-
tions under the Act had been for providing documents or information
to an agent of a foreign government.
66
Morison was an employee at the Naval Intelligence Support
Center (NISC) from 1974 to 1984. While working at NISC, Morrison
did off-duty work for Jane's Fighting Ships, a British publication. His
superiors at NISC had approved of the arrangement as long as Morison
did not violate any security requirements.
6 7
In 1984 Morison provided a related magazine, Jane's Defence
Weekly, with photographs produced by a KH-11 reconnaissance satel-
lite of a Soviet aircraft carrier under construction. 8 The government
claimed that, although the Soviets already had access to some KH-11
photographs, Morison's leak confirmed the satellite's capability. When
the police searched Morison's house after his arrest, they found secret
NISC intelligence reports. Although he had not yet given them to any-
one, Morison was not authorized to remove those documents from the
agency's offices.69 The district court convicted Morison for both the
distribution of the photographs to Jane's Defence Weekly and for the
illegal possession of the intelligence reports."0
Morison's conviction raises an obvious issue concerning the erosion
of First Amendment rights by prosecuting individuals who leak to the
notes 117-19 and accompanying text. Knowing if the United States has intelligence oper-
atives in Nicaragua or Israel, for example, would have significant public policy implica-
tions and would not simply be a technical detail.
64. 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988).
65. 18 U.S.C. § 793(d)-(e) (1988).
66. Morison, 844 F.2d at 1066-67 (plurality).
67. Id. at 1060.
68. Id. at 1061.
69, See id. at 1061-62.
70, The Fourth Circuit upheld Morison's conviction for violating the Espionage
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 793(d)-(e) (1988), and for violating 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1988), which prohib-
its the stealing of government documents. Morison, 844 F.2d at 1060 (plurality).
[Vol. 43
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press. Several commentators have, in fact, analyzed the balance be-
tween the government's interest in deterring leakers and the media's
interest in receiving information from leakers.
7 1
Morison, however, also raises a second First Amendment issue.
The government also could use the interpretation of the Espionage Act
that led to Morison's conviction to prosecute members of the press for
publishing classified information. Section 793(e), under which Morison
was convicted, applies to anyone "having unauthorized possession of
• . . information relating to the national defense [who] willfully com-
municates" that information.72 Technically, whenever the media pub-
lishes classified information, it is violating this law.7 3 Indeed, the court
in Morison quoted a long passage from Branzburg v. Hayes74 in which
the Supreme Court had stated that the First Amendment does not per-
mit a "'reporter or his news sources to violate valid criminal laws.' -,7
Morison generated a limited amount of commentary by the press
about potential prosecutions. 7 6 A number of newspapers filed an ami-
cus curiae brief with the Fourth Circuit and contended that the deci-
sion could "expose the press and its sources to criminal sanctions, re-
gardless of whether any injury to the United States is intended or
likely to result. 77 The approach of the Morison court appears to have
left this possibility open.
The media is not, however, the only group to notice the possibility
of prosecuting journalists under the Espionage Act. A similar finding
was reached by a Presidential Commission that studied the problems
of excessive government leaking and in 1982 reported their findings in
The Willard Report.78 The Commission analyzed laws that could be
71. See Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 38; Goldston, supra note 4; Jereen Trudell,
Note, The Constitutionality of Section 793 of the Espionage Act and Its Application to
Press Leaks, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 205 (1986).
72. 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (1988).
73. See Philip Weiss, The Quiet Coup: U.S. v. Morison: A Victory for Secret Gov-
ernment, HARPERS, Sept. 1989, at 54, 61 (arguing that members of the media have mis-
takenly ignored the danger of prosecution after Morison).
74. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
75. United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1068 (4th Cir.) (quoting Branzburg,
408 U.S. at 691), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988).
76. See Steven Burkholder, The Morison Case: The Leaker as "Spy," in FREEDOM
AT RISK: SECRECY, CENSORSHIP, AND REPRESSION IN THE 1980's 117, 117-19 (Richard 0.
Curry ed., 1988); Weiss, supra note 73, at 61.
77. Brief for Amici Curiae, Washington Post et. al., at 11, United States v. Mori-
son, 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir.) (No. 86-5008), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988).
78. See Presidential Directive on the Use of Polygraphs and Prepublication Re-
view: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong, 1st & 2d Sess. 166 (1985) (reprinting in appendix 2
a copy of The Willard Report: Report of the Interdepartmental Group on Unauthorized
Disclosures of Classified Information-March 31, 1982).
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used to block the dissemination of government information and con-
cluded that the Espionage Act "could also be used to prosecute a jour-
nalist who knowingly receives and publishes classified documents or
information.1
79
Of course, the probability of an administration choosing to prose-
cute a major newspaper or network for a violation of the Espionage Act
may not be very high. As a concurring opinion in Morison stated:
"[T]he political firestorm that would follow prosecution of one who ex-
posed an administration's own ineptitude would make such prosecu-
tions a rare and unrealistic prospect."'80 On the other hand, the mere
threat of such a prosecution might be intimidating enough to cause a
journalist not to publish information, rather than challenging the stat-
ute in court.
On at least one occasion, in fact, the threat of publication has been
used to deter a major newspaper from publishing national security in-
formation. In May of 1986 Ronald W. Pelton, a former National Secur-
ity Agency (NSA) employee, was tried for espionage as a result of alle-
gations that he had provided classified information to the Soviet
Union. The Washington Post learned that the information Pelton had
sold concerned one of the NSA's top-secret projects in which American
submarines were eavesdropping inside Soviet harbors. When the CIA
became aware of the Post's knowledge, William Casey, Director of the
CIA, told two editors of the paper that he would recommend prosecu-
tion of the paper if it published the story,8 1 and President Reagan
called Katherine Graham, Chairwoman of the Post, to repeat the warn-
ing. As a result of these threats, the Post delayed publication of the
story for over two weeks.
In the interim NBC broadcast the story and the threat against the
Post became moot. The CIA threatened to prosecute NBC reporter
James Polk, but in the end did not.82 Nevertheless, the threat of a
prosecution under the Espionage Act delayed the newspaper story for
two weeks, and the story possibly would have been kept from the pub-
lic indefinitely if NBC had not disclosed the information.
Ultimately, the validity of the laws that restrict publication or
broadcast of national security information are uncertain and untested.
The Espionage Act, as well as more specific statutes, and the govern-
ment's interpretation of the Act seem to authorize prosecution of jour-
79. Id. at 172.
80. Morison, 844 F.2d at 1084 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
81. See Stephen Engleberg, C.IA. Director Requests Inquiry on NBC Report, N.Y.
TihiEs, May 20, 1986, at A17.
82. See ELIE ABEL, LEAKING: WHO DOES IT? WHO BENEFITS? AT WHAT COST? 49-51
(1987).
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nalists who publish national security information, but the scope of that
authority remains in doubt. Anthony Lapham, general counsel of the
CIA, explained the effects of this confusion in 1979 Congressional
hearings.
We have then, at least in my opinion, the worst of both worlds. On the
one hand the laws stand idle and are not enforced at least in part
because their meaning is so obscure, and on the other hand it is likely
that the very obscurity of these laws serves to deter perfectly legiti-
mate expression and debate by persons who must be as unsure of
their liabilities as I am unsure of their obligations.
3
II. THE NEED FOR A BETTER BALANCING OF FIRST AMENDMENT AND
NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS
Part I of this Note examined the current framework of national
security laws and concluded that it creates a strong presumption in
favor of secrecy. This Part analyzes the effects of this presumption and
concludes that the current system fails to provide enough information
to the public.
A. The Need for Secrecy: Genuine Claims of National Security
The need for a certain amount of secrecy in making national se-
curity decisions is indisputable. Many military plans and intelligence
operations could not be accomplished without secrecy, and it is this
need for secrecy that creates the justification for First Amendment re-
strictions when national security interests are involved.
The Supreme Court has recognized for many years that national
security may justify restricting public access to information. In 1919,
for example, the Court considered the prosecution of individuals who
were trying to hinder the recruitment of troops for the war effort under
the "obstructing enlistments" provision of the Espionage Act of 1915.84
In upholding their convictions, the Court in Schenck v. United
States85 stated that free speech could be limited when "the words used
83. Espionage Laws and Leaks: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Legislation of
the Permanent House Select Comm. on Intelligence, 96th Cong., lst Sess. 14 (1979)
(statement of Anthony A. Lapham, General Counsel, C.I.A.) [hereinafter Laws and
Leaks]; see also Eric E. Ballou & Kyle E. McSlarrow, Note, Plugging the Leak: The
Case for a Legislative Resolution of the Conflict Between the Demands of Secrecy and
the Need for an Open Government, 71 VA. L. REv. 801 (1985) (discussing the applicable
statutes and their inability to effectively prevent leaks).
84. Pub. L. No. 65-24, tit. 1, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219.
85. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to prevent." ' Similarly, in Near v. Min-
nesota ex rel. Olsons7 the Court noted, "No one would question but
that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting
service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the num-
ber and location of troops."'88
These cases suggest that at times compelling reasons can justify
restricting the press from disseminating national security information.
If "[tihe most important service any government can provide is the
protection and perpetuation of the national existence,"' 9 then it is im-
possible to question the necessity of classifying certain types of infor-
mation and restricting its access to a limited number of individuals.
Prosecutions of journalists who publish nation security information can
be justified for the same reason.
Publication of information about United States intelligence capa-
bilities can compromise their effectiveness. For example, in Morison
the government claimed that the photograph of the Soviet naval base
that was leaked to Jane's Defence Weekly revealed the capabilities of
the KH-11 satellite,90 and therefore publication of the pictures could
help the Soviets determine how effectively United States spy satellites
operate.0 1 Similarly, if an enemy learns that the United States has pen-
etrated their security systems, they can take steps to counteract the
penetration.02 During World War II the United States had a great ad-
vantage against Japan because communication experts in Washington,
D.C. had broken Japanese military codes and publication of the fact
that the codes had been broken could have had a very damaging effect
on the United States war effort.9 3 Moreover, in addition to harming an
ongoing project, publication "can compromise a very expensive intelli-
86. Id. at 52; see also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627-28 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) ("A man may have to pay damages, may be sent to prison, at
common law might be hanged, if at the time of his act he knew facts from which com-
mon experience showed that the consequences would follow, whether he individually
could foresee them or not.").
87. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
88. Id. at 716 (citing CHAFEE, supra note 3, at 10).
89. Ballou & McSlarrow, supra note 83, at 824.
90. See United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1062 (4th Cir.) (plurality), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988).
91. This claim, however, is probably false. See infra notes 112-16 and accompany-
ing text.
92. See Laws and Leaks, supra note 83, at 26 (statement of Daniel B. Silver, Gen-
eral Counsel, National Security Agency).
93. Id. at 134 (statement of John M. Maury, Former Legislative Counsel to the
CIA).
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gence system on which we have spent millions or billions of dollars,
and which becomes worthless as a result of the leak." 9
There are also other circumstances such as military operations, de-
velopment of weapons, discussions with allies, and intelligence opera-
tions in which secrecy is critical. For example, in the summer of 1974
the CIA attempted to recover a Soviet submarine that had sunk off the
Hawaiian coast in 1968. The salvage was one-third completed when the
Los Angeles Times disclosed the project and permitted Soviet vessels
to move into the area and make the project impractical. 5
These examples demonstrate that at times national security claims
may be quite valid when used to justify restrictions on media access to
information. Although this Note contends that the current system
gives excessive weight to national security claims, it nevertheless recog-
nizes that public access to national security information must be lim-
ited at times.
B. Too Much Secrecy: Illegitimate Claims of National Security
As discussed above, there are situations in which national security
concerns create a need for secrecy. At other times, however, national
security claims are used to block the dissemination of information
when national security is not in danger. This section examines a num-
ber of ways in which national security claims are raised in situations
where the claim is unjustified.
1. The Vagueness of the Term "National Security"
One problem with permitting secrecy whenever claims of national
security or national defense are raised is that those terms are inher-
ently vague. "[N]ational security is a very ambiguous term . . . . Most
people are for it, but what does it mean?"9 6 Indeed, "just about every-
thing worth knowing can be viewed in one way or another as possibly
impacting adversely on national security . . . ., The general goal of
protecting national security is readily apparent-to ensure our nation's
94. Floyd Abrams et al., The First Amendment and National Security, 43 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 61, 88 (1988) (statement of Richard K. Willard).
95. Ballou & McSlarrow, supra note 83, at 801-02.
96. ARTHUR M. Cox, THE MYTHS OF NATIONAL SECURITY 3 (1975).
97. Civil Liberties and the National Security State, 1984: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 6 (1984) (statement of Floyd
Abrams) [hereinafter Civil Liberties Hearings]; see also New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971) (per curiam) (Black, J., concurring) ("The word 'secur-
ity' is a broad, vague generality. .. ").
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survival, but in practice it is a much more difficult proposition to de-
termine what information this protection should encompass.98
The Espionage Act9 and the Freedom of Information Act 00 both
use the term "relating to the national defense" instead of national se-
curity.101 That phrase, however, is also imprecise. As Judge Learned
Hand noted in United States v. Heine,102 "every part . . . of the na-
tional economy and everything tending to disclose the national mind
are important in time of war, and will then 'relate to the national
defense.' ,,1o3
Thus, when the President is authorized to classify anything re-
lated to the national defense or to prosecute journalists for publishing
information related to the national defense, the limits of this power are
not clear. Statutes that are based on these terms lack clear parameters
and create a danger of overclassification because "[n]ot all military in-
formation is equally sensitive and some of it is badly needed for public
debate."" 4
The inherent vagueness of the terms "national security" and "na-
tional defense" ultimately makes them susceptible to being invoked in
situations in which the danger is not nearly as significant as what is
alleged. The debate over the publication of the Pentagon Papers in
New York Times Co. v. United States provides a good example of how
these claims can be exaggerated. The claims of national security that
were raised in the case led a number of people to focus on the potential
consequences that could result from publication. In his dissent Justice
Blackmun said that Judge Wilkey, who had dissented in the court of
appeals opinion, may have been correct when he argued that the Pen-
tagon Papers if published "'could clearly result in great harm to the
nation.' ,105 Justice Blackmun said that by "great harm" Judge Wilkey
98. Cox, supra note 96, at 63; see also Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1200
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (arguing that the term "national security" is inherently vague and ham-
pers careful analysis when constitutional rights may be invaded to protect it), aff'd in
part and dismissed in part, 452 U.S. 713 (1981).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 793 (1988).
100. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
101. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 793(d)-(f) (1988); 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A) (1988); cf. 18
U.S.C. § 793(a) (1988) ("respecting the national defense"); id. § 793(b)-(c) ("connected
with the national defense").
102. 151 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 833 (1946).
103. Id. at 815.
104. Benjamin S. DuVal, Jr., The Occasions of Secrecy, 47 U. Prrr. L. R.v. 579, 591
(1986).
105. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 762 (1971) (per curiam)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Washington Post Co., 446 F.2d
1327, 1330 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) (Wilkey, J., dissenting), aff'd sub nom. New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)).
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meant "'the death of soldiers, the destruction of alliances, the greatly
increased difficulty of'negotiation with our enemies, the inability of our
diplomats to negotiate.' "6 During the New York Times trial, the Sec-
retary of the Army testified that publication of the Papers "would do
grave and irreparable harm to [the] nation and its people."' 07 Henry
Kissinger commented that the publication of the Pentagon Papers
would destroy relations with China.lus Obviously, all of these predic-
tions of gloom and doom did not come true; yet the predictions are
understandable because it can be very difficult to accurately assess
claims of national security threats.
The problem results from the danger of the concept of national
security taking on mythical elements. When national security claims
are raised to justify curtailing liberties, pressures generally favor the
national security claims.109 The tendency is to presume that our na-
tional survival is in serious jeopardy whenever the government invokes
the term even though this is rarely the case. Yet it is very difficult to
challenge these claims because the same administration that classified
the information in the first place is the only party with the knowledge
to evaluate the validity of the classification decision-thereby echoing
Edgar and Schmidt's warning about letting the fox define the parame-
ters of the chicken coop." 0
2. The Labeling of Public Information As Secret
There are compelling reasons to keep some national security infor-
mation secret. At the same time, however, it should also be recognized
that "[o]nce secrets are out, they are out. You cannot rebottle old
secrets . . . ."" The government at times treats information that al-
ready has escaped their control as secret. By doing this, the govern-
ment attempts to deny United States citizens access to information
that many other nations already possess. Close examination of the
facts involved in many of the cases that have been used to justify re-
strictions on the media reveals government efforts to prohibit the dis-
semination of already public information.
In United States v. Morison, 2 for example, the government
claimed that the publication of the KH-11 photographs would reveal
106. Id. (quoting Washington Post, 446 F.2d at 1330 (Wilkey, J., dissenting)).
107. Abrams, supra note 94, at 68 (statement of Floyd Abrams).
108. Id. at 88 (statement of Don Oberdorfer).
109. See generally Thomas I. Emerson, National Security and Civil Liberties, 9
YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 78, 80-81 (1982).
110. Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 38, at 354.
111. Abrams, supra note 94, at 69 (statement of Floyd Abrams).
112. 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988).
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United States satellite capabilities to the Soviet Union." 3 In reality,
however, Morison may have been prosecuted for allowing the Soviets
to obtain information that they already possessed. In 1978 William
Kampiles sold the Russians a copy of the manual for the same satellite
and was convicted of espionage. 114 In 1981 Aviation Week and Space
Technology published a picture of a Soviet airfield and bomber that
was taken by the satellite."15 Finally, in 1980 a number of KH-11
photos were left behind after the aborted rescue attempt of the Ameri-
can hostages in the Iran desert, and Iran put these photos in a book
and distributed them around the world."
6
The case of Philip Agee, which led to the enactment of the Intelli-
gence Identities Protection Act," 7 also provides an interesting exam-
ple. In an effort to undermine the CIA, Philip Agee and Louis Wolf
published the names of over 3000 undercover CIA agents,'" and it is
tempting to argue that Agee's publications had a devastating effect
upon United States intelligence operations. Yet if Agee could easily
identify so many names simply by travelling all over the world, the
agents' cover could not have been very effective. It is difficult to believe
that absent Agee's publications, neither the KGB nor the nation in
which the operatives were based could have discovered the presence of
the agents that Agee and Wolf so easily identified."19
The prosecution of the Progressive120 for publishing the formula
for building an atomic bomb raises similar questions about whether
information labeled secret truly is secret. First, because the formula for
the atomic bomb was available to the public, or at least easily deriva-
ble, the Progressive probably was not providing other nations with
anything that they did not already know."' Further, the barrier to
113. See id. at 1062.
114. United States v. Kampiles, 609 F.2d 1233, 1236 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 954 (1980).
115. Brief for Appellant, at 8-9, United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir.)
(No. 86-5008), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988).
116. Id.
117. 50 U.S.C. §§ 421-426 (1988).
118. Bivens, supra note 62, at 845.
119. Supporters of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act blamed the 1975 death
of Richard Welch, the CIA station chief in Athens, on the identification of his name in
Counterspy. That criticism ignores, however, the fact that an East German magazine
already had revealed Welch's identity and that he had ignored warnings and chosen to
live in the home of the previous Athens CIA station chief. EvE PELL, THE BIG CHILL 59
(1984).
120. See supra text accompanying notes 54-60.
121. Mary M. Cheh, The Progressive Case and the Atomic Energy Act: Waking to
the Dangers of Government Information Control, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 163, 204-05
(1980).
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building the bomb stemmed from the difficulty of obtaining plutonium,
not from the difficulty of obtaining the formula.'22 Thus, a terrorist
who learned the formula for building an atomic bomb by reading the
magazine still would not be capable of building the weapon. Finally,
"equally lethal chemical and biological weapons are widely known,
much less expensive, and easier to obtain." '' Indeed, no evidence indi-
cates that the nuclear proliferation which the government was at-
tempting to prevent resulted from the publication of the Progressive's
article.
Professors Edgar and Schmidt identified an additional factor con-
cerning publication of information that is already in the public do-
main. The greatest damage to the United States may occur when it is
acting on the mistaken belief that leaked information is still secret. 2"
After an agent's cover has been blown, it may be better to have that
fact definitively established rather than have the government still op-
erating under the false assumption that the agent's identity is secret
because at that point, there is a reasonable probability that the infor-
mation already has reached the enemy. Nations have become so skilled
at espionage that "the first persons to obtain disclosed information are
likely to be precisely those from whom the government is most inter-
ested in keeping the information.""1
25
A few years ago England found itself in an absurd situation after
prohibiting publication of the book Spycatcher for national security
reasons at the same time that it was on the best seller list in the
United States and British citizens were regularly smuggling copies into
England. 12 Although at times the government is justified in classifying
information and attempting to keep it secret, once it has reached the
press, it should be treated as if it is in the public domain.
3. Using National Security to Manipulate Debate
The greatest danger that can result from illegitimate claims of na-
tional security was noted by Professor Thomas Emerson, who wrote:
122. See id. 204, 205 & nn.274-75.
123. Jeffrey A. Smith, Prior Restraint: Original Intentions and Modern Interpreta-
tions, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 464 (1987) (citation omitted).
124. Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 38, at 401.
125. Susan D. Charkes, Note, The Constitutionality of the Intelligence Identities
Protection Act, 83 COLUM L. REV. 727, 747 (1983).
126. Abrams, supra note 94, at 69 (statement of Floyd Abrams); see also History
Bleached at State, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1990, at A26 (editorial) (noting that the State
Department and the CIA have refused to declassify information about support that the
United States provided to the Shah of Iran in 1953 even though this information is 38
years old and is common knowledge).
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"[W]hen national security claims are advanced there may well be a
confusion of the interests of the administration in power with the in-
terests of the nation.' 1 27 At times information may be classified be-
cause it reveals illegal acts or because it will undermine administrative
policies, and for the same reasons, leakers and reporters may be
threatened with prosecution if they publish the information. "Of
course, there are some real secrets, but hardly as many as the Execu-
tive Branch would have us believe.'
128
Current laws allow the executive branch to choose which docu-
ments to classify and which to make available. They also can choose
which leakers to prosecute and which to leave alone. 129 In a nation in
which forty percent of high level administrative officials admit to hav-
ing leaked information for what they believed to be legitimate policy
reasons,130 one should skeptically view the government's choice of
which leaks to tolerate. Selective classification of information and pros-
ecution of leakers allows an administration to create a "false consen-
sus"1 31 of support for its policies, and therefore, information may be
classified to prevent domestic criticism, rather than to enhance na-
tional security.
1 32
As Bob Schieffer of CBS News explained to Congress, Executive
Order 12,356 undermines legitimate debate because now "the official
response may be to say nothing, or to revert to the old standby: 'if only
you had the information I have, you would understand.' ",33 As an ex-
ample, he pointed out that the second exemption covers "'the vulnera-
bilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relat-
ing to the national security.' ''1 4 Thus, information concerning
127. Emerson, supra note 109, at 80-81; see also United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314 (1972) ("Given the difficulty of defining the domestic
security interest, the danger of abuse in acting to protect that interest becomes appar-
ent."); In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 391 (4th Cir. 1986) ("History teaches
how easily the spectre of a threat to 'national security' may be used to justify a wide
variety of repressive government actions.").
128. Civil Liberties Hearings, supra note 97, at 6 (statement of Floyd Abrams).
129. See Note, Keeping Secrets: Congress, the Courts, and National Security Infor-
mation, 103 HARV. L. REV. 906, 906 (1990).
130. Abrams, supra note 94, at 76 (statement of Don Oberdorfer); see also STANS-
FIELD TURNER, SECRECY AND DEMOCRACY: THE CIA IN TRANSITION 149 (1985).
131. Scot Powe, Espionage, Leaks and the First Amendment, BULL. ATOM. SCEEN-
TIST, June-July 1986, at 10.
132. See Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Educ. Project v. Brown, 643 F.2d 569, 572
(9th Cir. 1980) (noting that the government could "escape the consequences of ... an
unpopular decision by concealing. . . the fact that such a decision has been or may be
made"), rev'd sub nom. Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Educ. Project,
454 U.S. 139 (1981).
133. Hearings, supra note 21, at 99 (statement of Bob Schieffer).
134. Id. at 98 (quoting Exec. Order, supra note 9, § 1.3[2]).
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expensive flaws in the M-1 tank could be kept secret, 135 enabling the
administration to continue to generate public support for a flawed pro-
ject by withholding information. This is not to say that there are no
important reasons for keeping the information secret, but rather to
point out the existence of factors supporting disclosure.
Two recent examples illustrate this manipulation of national se-
curity laws. On April 4, 1986, Richard Burt, Ambassador to West Ger-
many, revealed that United States intelligence had determined that
Libyan agents were operating in Europe. Five days later General Ber-
nard W. Rogers made the same revelation. These revelations were in-
tended to build up support for President Reagan's anti-Libyan posi-
tion.13' Yet the revelations also were violations of the Espionage Act
because they revealed that the United States had broken a secret Lib-
yan code and, therefore, had given the Libyans an opportunity to
change their codes."37 There is a substantial likelihood that Burt and
Rogers would have been prosecuted had their revelations hindered
rather than enhanced government policies.
A 1985 column in the New York Times revealed similar selective
use of leaks in connection with the Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI). 138 A number of scientists working on the project did not believe
in its feasibility and became frustrated with the selective leaking of
studies. The article quoted Ray Kidder, a physicist at Livermore Labo-
ratory: "The public is getting swindled by one side that has access to
classified information and can say whatever it wants and not go to jail,
whereas we [the skeptics] can't say whatever we want. We would go to
jail, that's the difference. '"" 9 The column also noted that Energy Secre-
tary John S. Herrington had denounced the critics of SDI for hurting
the national interest,"10 illustrating that political factors may have a
great deal to do with the determination of whether or not a leak is
harmful to national security.
Indeed, although excessive restrictions on public access to infor-
mation are a threat to the First Amendment, selective restrictions may
be even worse. When no public access is permitted in a particular area,
the public is uninformed, but when selective classification occurs, the
public may mistakenly believe that they are making fully informed de-
cisions. Justice Douglas recognized this point when he wrote that "the
government usually suppresses damaging news but highlights favorable
135. Id.
136. ABEL, supra note 82, at 48-49.
137. Id.
138. Flora Lewis, A "Star Wars" Cover-Up, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1985, at A31.
139. Id. (brackets in original)
140. Id.
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news. In this filtering process the secrecy stamp is the officials' tool of
suppression and it has been used to withhold information which in '99
'/2 %' of the cases would present no danger to national security.'
4
C. Recognizing the First Amendment Value of National Security
Information
Part II(B) of this Note demonstrated that national security may
be used as a justification for secrecy in situations in which national
security is not really jeopardized. In those situations it might be possi-
ble to argue that secrecy is still warranted because it is important to
err on the side of protecting our national survival even if that pre-
sumption results in excessive secrecy. 14 2 Certainly if there were no ben-
efits to public disclosure of government information, this point would
be valid; however, this section argues that excessive secrecy creates
harms of its own.
1. General First Amendment Interests
"The preservation of a full and free flow of information to the gen-
eral public [is] a core objective of the First Amendment" 43 because, as
the Court recognized in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,1" "[w]ithout
the information provided by the press most of us and many of our rep-
resentatives would be unable to vote intelligently or to register opin-
ions on the administration of government generally." 45 Thus, when in-
formation is classified or when criminal sanctions are used to block the
publication of information, those steps conflict with the First Amend-
ment goal of ensuring the public has access to information.
In order for access to be meaningful, the information provided
must be relevant and significant, As the Court explained in NAACP v.
Button146 when it considered a NAACP challenge to a statute that lim-
ited its right to recruit new members, "abstract discussion is not the
only species of communication which the Constitution protects." 147
Likewise, in the context of national security, it is meaningless to have
abstract debate about policies without the availability of relevant facts.
When national security statutes are used to deny information to
141. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 641-42 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
142. See Emerson, supra note 109, at 80.
143. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 30 (1978) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
144. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
145. Id. at 492.
146. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
147. Id. at 429.
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the press, significant harm to the First Amendment's role in informing
the public results. As the Court noted in Smith v. Daily Mail Publish-
ing Co.,'" "[a] free press cannot be made to rely solely upon the suffer-
ance of government to supply it with information. '" The First
Amendment "has a structural role to play"'150 in our governmental sys-
tem "[flor speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expres-
sion; it is the essence of self-government."'15 Our leaders and the poli-
cies they implement are determined by the citizens. To make those
choices in an effective and responsible manner, citizens need to be
aware of the information that is the basis for their decisions. Although
there is some need for secrecy, any law that unduly limits the availabil-
ity of information to the public runs counter to Professor Emerson's
statement that "government's business is, generally speaking, the pub-
lic's business.
1 52
In addition to its role in self-government, access to information
serves an important checking function. "The purpose of the First
Amendment and the Bill of Rights is to protect citizens against govern-
ment."' 153 By providing accurate information to the public, the press
makes criticism of the government more persuasive. As noted earlier,
administrations may use the label "national security" to close off ac-
cess because it sheds a poor light on them. Consequently, there is a
strong public interest in placing information that an administration
has classified for reasons of self-interest back into the public domain.
At a general level, the First Amendment therefore protects a right
to information that promotes effective self-government and provides
opportunity for the public to check governmental abuses. But the right
to information is not valuable only because it is encompassed within
148. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
149. Id. at 104 (citing Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11 (1978) (plurality);
Brazburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)).
150- Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (emphasis and citations 'omitted).
151. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964); see also Mills v. Alabama, 384
U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("[T]here is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of
[the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs."); Al-
exander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245, 255
(asserting that the First Amendment "is concerned, not with private right, but with a
public power, a governmental responsibility").
152. Laws and Leaks, supra note 83, at 164.
153. Id.; see also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488 (1957) (noting that the
First Amendment is based in part on" 'efforts to secure freedom from oppressive admin-
istration . . . to supply the public need for information'") (quoting Thornhill v. Ala-
bama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940)); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250
(1936) ("[I]nformed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovern-
ment , . . ."); Blasi, supra note 3.
1992]
23
Topol: United States v. Morison: A Threat to the First Amendment Right t
Published by Scholar Commons, 1992
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
First Amendment theory. In the context of national security decision-
making, wide dissemination of information generally results in better
decisions and, consequently, enhanced national security.
2. The Importance of Access to National Security Information
Supporters of restrictions on the publication of national security
information often argue that the need for secrecy is justified because
the classified decisions are critical to our national survival. Although
the supporters are certainly correct in pointing out the importance of
such decisions, the importance of the issues at stake actually justifies
more openness. As the Court noted in De Jonge v. Oregon:1'5 "The
greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incite-
ments to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the
more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional
rights"1 55 of the First Amendment. Justice Black adopted this same
reasoning in his concurring opinion in New York Times Co. v. United
States. 5 He opposed any restrictions on press publication of national
security information because a free press is critical "to prevent any
part of the government from deceiving the people and sending them off
to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell.' 57
Similarly, Alexander Meiklejohn wrote that the Framers specifically in-
tended that the First Amendment operate absolutely during time of
war. 158
Although there may be strategic advantages to waging military
campaigns in total secrecy, that notion runs counter to the First
Amendment goals of self-government and checking governmental
abuses. The public's interest in access to information when difficult po-
litical decisions are being made is greater than when routine issues, in
which there is a broad national consensus, are being resolved. Pres-
ently, the United States faces critical decisions on how to adapt to
changing conditions in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and
the Middle East (as well as many other areas in the world). It is essen-
tial that those decisions not be made in secret or in a setting that effec-
tively silences the opposition. 59
Critics of openness admit that there are legitimate interests in
having open debate, but they claim that certain details must be kept
154. 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
155. Id. at 365.
156. 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).
157. Id.
158. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 3, at 20.
159. See Goldston, supra note 4, at 450-51.
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secret. The problem with the critics' position is that frequently the de-
tails are the most important part of the debate. For example, evalua-
tions of policies concerning nuclear weapons and arms control necessa-
rily depend on knowledge of the details. Governmental authorities
regularly decide whether or not the United States should spend bil-
lions of dollars on weapons programs such as the Strategic Defense Ini-
tiative (SDI) and the Stealth Bomber. 160 A decision about whether or
not to support a weapons program cannot be made effectively without
knowing the answers to important questions, such as: Will it work? If
it works, will it stop all or most missiles? Finally, what will be the
likely reaction by other nations with nuclear capability?
Although it is reasonable to keep some of the details secret to pro-
tect a defense system, it is unreasonable to expect meaningful debate
on the subject if the only information provided to the public is a vague
promise that the system will work perfectly and enhance national se-
curity.16' Obviously, if a proposition is put forth in that manner, with-
out any of the facts from the other side, the chances of a program re-
ceiving support are enhanced.
Similar issues arise in evaluating arms control proposals and ef-
forts to stop third world nations from developing new weapons sys-
tems. For example, an important element of arms control negotiations
is the details of verification; consequently, "[y]ou cannot talk about
[the steps in the verification process] without talking about them tech-
nically.' 62 Yet in theory the Atomic Energy Act should block the dis-
cussion of such details. Although, with the exception of the suit against
the Progressive,'6 3 the Act has never been used against the press, the
possibility of such use exists. On its face, the Act authorizes injunc-
tions "prohibiting the publication of articles about the Salt II treaty,
speculation that the United States is developing new or different nu-
clear weapons, evidence that nuclear reactors are unsafe, [or] a new
discovery that would make the production of nuclear power safer."'"
There are also situations in which violation of the Intelligence
Identities Protection Act would be necessary to further legitimate de-
bate. For example, "investigative journalists seeking to ascertain the
role of the CIA in the overthrow of the Allende government in Chile,
its part in the attempted assassination of Fidel Castro, or even its re-
cruitment efforts on college campuses" would violate the Act. 6 5 The
160. See Powe, supra note 131, at 10.
161. See Lewis, supra note 138, at A31 (discussing these claims about SOT).
162. Abrams, supra note 94, at 83 (statement of Floyd Abrams).
163. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
164. Cheh, supra note 121, at 197-98.
165. Emerson, supra note 109, at 94.
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recent events of the Iran-Contra debacle further demonstrate how
damaging it can be to implement public policy in secret.
In her article on the Atomic Energy Act, Mary Cheh points out the
difficulty that advocates of a broad First Amendment have in the na-
tional security context. "When the question is, 'in light of the possible
harm, do we need to know that particular information, that specific
data?,' the answer will invariably be 'no.' ""6 In most cases restricting
publication of one particular fact to preserve its secrecy will not seri-
ously impair public debate. The problem is that the same argument
can be made for virtually any fact or document, and at some point
restriction of information can render public discussion worthless or,
worse yet, create a false perception of meaningful debate.
3. Access As a Means to Better Decisionmaking
Early in 1961, shortly before the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the New Re-
public and the New York Times became aware of many of the plan's
details. Both publications were concerned about the damage that could
result if they published all the available information, and they volunta-
rily checked their stories with the Kennedy Administration to prevent
the revelation of critical national security details. After the invasion
President Kennedy told Turner Catledge of the New York Times: "'If
you had printed more about the operation you would have saved us
from a colossal mistake.' "167
Although public discussion may eliminate the possibility of an op-
eration that depends on secrecy, 6 8 it also may avert tragic mistakes by
exposing flawed planning. 169 Some have argued, for example, that the
Vietnam War serves as an example of the potential consequences of
developing operations and strategies while keeping large amounts of
information out of the public domain. 170 Justice Douglas explained this
functional element of the First Amendment in his concurring opinion
in New York Times Co. v. United States.' "Secrecy in government is
fundamentally anti-democratic, perpetuating bureaucratic errors. Open
debate and discussion of public issues are vital to our national
health."1
7 2
166. Cheh, supra note 121, at 200.
167. Cox, supra note 96, at 121.
168. See, e.g., Ballou & McSlarrow, supra note 83, at 801-03 ("Project Jennifer").
169. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 96, at 121 (discussing the Bay of Pigs).
170. See, e.g., MORTON H. HALPERIN & DANIEL N. HOFFMAN, ToP SECRET: NATIONAL
SECURITY AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW (1977); Goldston, supra note 4, at 451-52.
171. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam) (Douglas, J., concurring).
172. Id. at 724.
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Secrecy often can be counterproductive 1 3 because public debate
encourages criticism that can reveal flaws in plans or policies. 17 4 When
a group of individuals from the same political party who share the
same views decide policies in secret, they may fail to properly consider
alternative viewpoints and options, which results in increased chances
for error.7 5 This link between secrecy and poor decisions was noted by
former Congressman McCloskey, who stated that "[t]he failures of our
system-of our government-have been paralleled by failures of the
press."'7 6 He pointed out that there was no press coverage of school
segregation before 1954 or discrimination before the civil rights move-
ment. Similarly, there was silence on the subject of Japanese intern-
ments during World War II and minimal coverage of the possible risks
of stock market investment before 1929. He contended that poor, or
nonexistent, press coverage contributed to these national failures.
7 7
In contrast, there are numerous examples in which the press con-
tributed to national security by disclosing classified information. 78 A
December 22, 1974 story in the New York Times revealed that the CIA
was running domestic operations against antiwar demonstrators. The
story led to a reorganization of the CIA and an increase in congres-
sional oversight. '7 An April 26, 1981 article in the Chicago Sun-Times
revealed a number of flaws in plans for the M-1 tank and led to ques-
tioning of defense procurement policies. 8 ' A story in the Washington
Post on October 2, 1986, revealed that the administration had
launched a campaign of "disinformation" against Moammar Gadhafi.
This article demonstrated how the Reagan Administration deceived
both the American public and our allies regarding United States policy
toward Libya.'8 '
When evaluating any statute designed to restrict the media's right
to publish national security information, it is important to recognize
that the information being restricted can have a very positive impact
on the decisionmaking process. It is possible to advocate an active
press without being against national security. A 1986 note in the
173. See Ben H. Bagdikian, Foreword to DONNA A. DEMAC, KEEPING AMERICA UNIN-
FORMED: GOVERNMENT SECRECY IN THE 1980's at xi-xii (1984); Laws and Leaks, supra
note 83, at 44-45 (statement of Thomas I. Emerson).
174. See Goldston, supra note 4, at 450-51.
175. See id. at 451.
176. PAUL N. MCCLOSKEY, JR., TRUTH AND UNTRUTH: POLITICAL DECEIT IN AMERICA
209 (1972).
177. Id.
178. Brief for Amici Curiae, Washington Post et. al., at 29-32, United States v. Mor-
ison, 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir.) (No. 86-5008), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988).
179. Id. at 29-30.
180. Id. at 30.
181. Id. at 32.
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Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review explained this point
very effectively when it stated: "As increasing numbers of important
decision are made on the basis of information to which the public is
denied access, the accountability of elected officials declines, the dis-
tance between the governed and their servants grows even larger, and
our nation becomes less and less 'secure.' "182
III. USING THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO BALANCE THE BENEFITS OF
OPENNESS AND THE NEED FOR SECRECY
Part II of this Note argued that the status quo places too much
emphasis on the use of secrecy to promote national security and as a
result undermines the public's participation in the decisionmaking pro-
cess. Yet that part also noted that in certain situations the need for
secrecy is critical to effective government. Consequently, at some point
an inevitable clash must occur between the need for secrecy and the
benefits of disclosure. Two First Amendment questions arise from this
clash. First, if openness is an essential element of the First Amend-
ment, why should our society ever permit secrecy in government? Sec-
ond, under what circumstances should our society permit secrecy?
A. Secrecy Within the First Amendment
In the United States it is the people, not elected officials, who gov-
ern, 83 and therefore "that government may be responsive to the will of
the people . . . is a fundamental principle of our constitutional sys-
tem." 8' The First Amendment plays a vital role in this system by fa-
cilitating public access to information. Only by being adequately in-
formed can citizens determine if their government is responsive to
their wishes and meaningfully participate in the political process.",
The more the government operates in secrecy, the less ability the peo-
ple have to exercise control over their officials.""'
In order to be truly responsive to the people in certain areas, how-
ever, the government also must be able to operate in secrecy because
certain programs that the public may support can be implemented
182. Goldston, supra note 4, at 451.
183. See, e.g., MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 3, at 107-24 (testimony on the meaning of
the First Amendment).
184. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
185. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982) (holding
that press access to a criminal rape trial is mandated by the First Amendment).
186. Professor Greenawalt identified this approach as the "liberal democracy" justi-
fication for free speech that is based on the consequences of utilizing the First Amend-
ment. Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 119, 145 (1989).
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only in secrecy."" For example, the people may want the government
to establish good diplomatic relations with other nations, and that task
would be impossible without some amount of secrecy. Likewise, a mili-
tary invasion that the public supports would be seriously jeopardized if
every detail were disseminated to the public for their approval.
Consequently, in same situations secret national security decision-
making is consistent with the First Amendment. In those situations,
however, secrecy is justified because the citizens choose to permit it,
not because the citizens are incapable of making intelligent decisions.
The value of disclosing important information is still fundamental to
our democracy.
This theory of the First Amendment could be labeled functional18
or consequential. 8 9 According to this theory the First Amendment is
valuable because of its role in keeping government responsive to the
people. But at the point the First Amendment becomes a barrier to
government responsiveness, the people may choose to give up some
First Amendment openness in order to achieve their goals.
Zechariah Chafee explained that the First Amendment protects "a
social interest in the attainment of truth, so that the country may not
only adopt the wisest course of action but carry it out in the wisest
way."1 10 The current system of classification is harming this social in-
terest by making it impossible for the public to become involved in
many national security decisions that do not require secrecy. 91 Secrecy
should be permitted only in situations in which openness would block
the achievement of the wisest course of action.
B. Where to Draw the Line
If we accept the notion of allowing some secrecy within the con-
fines of the First Amendment, the next step is to determine how much
should be permitted. The goal is to allow enough secrecy to enable gov-
ernment to be effective without reducing its responsiveness to the peo-
ple. A useful analogy for drawing this line can be derived from Su-
preme Court decisions over the past twenty years that involve press
access to prisons' 92 and press access to criminal trials.193 In those opin-
187. See supra notes 84-95 and accompanying text.
188. See CHAFEE, supra note 3, at 31.
189. See Greenawalt, supra note 186, at 127-30.
190. CHAFEE, supra note 3, at 33.
191. See supra part II(B).
192. E.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,
417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pel v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
193. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986); Globe Newspa-
per Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
1992]
29
Topol: United States v. Morison: A Threat to the First Amendment Right t
Published by Scholar Commons, 1992
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ions members of the Court stressed the value of public dissemination
of information. For example, in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia104 the Court held that generally the press could not be excluded
from attending criminal trials because absent a compelling reason, the
First Amendment "'prohibit[s] government from limiting the stock of
information from which members of the public may draw.' ,,195 Simi-
larly, in Houchins v. KQED, Inc.19 6 Justice Stevens wrote that "[i]t is
not sufficient, therefore, that the channels of communication be free of
governmental restraints; ' 197 rather, the government must "insure that
the citizens are fully informed regarding matters of public interest and
importance. "9
Having recognized the value of an informed public, those cases set
forth a balancing test that took into account the government's obliga-
tion "to ensure that this constitutionally protected 'discussion of gov-
ernment affairs' is an informed one."' 9 The Court balanced two con-
siderations: "[W]hether public access plays a significant positive role in
the functioning of the particular process"' 00 and whether "denial is ne-
cessitated by a compelling government interest.' 2 1 These same two in-
terests also should be weighed in the national security context.
The problem with the current system of handling national security
information is not that it permits secrecy; rather, the problem lies in
the fact that the system fails to balance the secrecy with the benefits of
openness. The important role that an active press plays in formulating
national security policy is frequently ignored. 2 2 Consequently, the ex-
448 U.S. 555 (1980).
194. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
195. Id. at 576 (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)).
196. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
197. Id. at 32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
198. Id.; see also Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring)
("This is a watershed case. . . [N]ever before has [the Court] squarely held that the
acquisition of newsworthy matter is entitled to any constitutional protection
whatsoever.").
199. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605 (1982).
200. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (citing Globe
Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606).
201. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 607 (citations omitted). The Court also has con-
sidered whether "the place and process have historically been open to the press and
general public." Press-Enterprise, 478 U.S. at 8.
This factor seems irrelevant in the national security context because if access is de-
termined to have a significant First Amendment function that outweighs the govern-
ment's interest in secrecy, tradition becomes a poor reason to continue the practice. Cir-
cumstances have changed a great deal during the two hundred years since the tradition
developed. Moreover, it is not clear that the denial of a right of access was ever a good
policy.
202. See supra part II(C).
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ecutive branch uses secrecy in many situations in which it is not sup-
ported by a compelling state interest.
203
There are times when secrecy "must. . .be balanced against free-
dom of speech, but freedom of speech ought to weigh very heavily in
the scale."20 4 Unfortunately, when national security is at stake in our
current system, the balancing tends to weigh very heavily in favor of
secrecy. 20 5 Executive Order 12,356 favors secrecy by encouraging offi-
cials to classify information when in doubt.208 Similarly, the govern-
ment has made threats of prosecution to deter publication of classified
information.
2 0 7
These approaches create a presumption in favor of secrecy that
should be replaced by a presumption in favor of openness. The goal
should be to maximize the amount of information in the public domain
while permitting the government to utilize secrecy only when it is nec-
essary to effectively respond to the wishes of the people.
IV. CREATING A BETTER FRAMEWORK
New legislation is needed to regulate the conflict between press
publication and national security secrecy. Such legislation should ac-
complish at least two goals. First, Congress should attempt to decrease
executive branch discretion0 " by enacting more comprehensive stat-
utes that take greater account of the fundamental conflict between the
need for secrecy and the value of openness. Although the Espionage
Act's prosecution provisions are elaborate, they attempt to cover too
many issues at once by simultaneously applying to spies, journalists,
and leakers.20 9 The issues at stake are important enough for Congress
to draft statutes that are clearly worded and separate from the Espio-
nage Act. 10
Second, Congress should increase its involvement and the involve-
ment of the courts in the process. In the status quo the executive
branch has almost exclusive control over classification decisions 2 1 and
203. See supra part 1I(B).
204. CHAFEE, supra note 3, at 31.
205. Emerson, supra note 109, at 85 ("The heaviest pressures are usually found on
the side of national security and the rights of the individual are balanced away.").
206. See supra part I(A)(1).
207. See supra part I(B).
208. See supra part I(A).
209. Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 38, at 407.
210. Id.; see also United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1085 (4th Cir. 1988)
(Phillips, J., concurring) ("[T]he Espionage Act statutes as now broadly drawn are un-
wieldy and imprecise instruments . . . ."), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988).
211. Cheh, supra note 23, at 690; see supra notes 9-38 and accompanying text.
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is free to classify based on its own criteria without judicial review.2 1 2
Similarly, the executive branch makes decisions about whether to
threaten prosecution of the media on the basis of imprecise statutes.
2 13
In an ideal world the executive branch would independently real-
ize the value of public debate and permit as much disclosure as possi-
ble. Since that realization is unlikely, however, Congress and the courts
must become more involved in determining the rules of the game. Con-
gress can become much more active in the process by drafting more
precise legislation. Although the executive branch may ultimately have
to decide what to classify and when to prosecute, Congress can reduce
the element of discretion by implementing clearer standards.
2 14
Courts could become much more involved by recognizing that they
have a "clear responsibility to inquire into whether national security
claims override traditional constitutional rights or liberties." '215 A new
approach to national security secrecy must provide for judicial review
of the conflict between protection and disclosure, and judges must be
willing to accept that role.
A. Increasing Access
Instead of relying on executive orders, Congress should draft com-
prehensive legislation to deal with national security classification that
takes account of the executive branch's tendency to overclassify. That
legislation should also factor in the benefits of public disclosure.
Rather than enacting an open-ended provision, Congress should draft a
national security exemption to FOIA that provides explicit guidance
for resolving the essential issues: What areas are covered? Who in the
executive branch has the authority to decide? How significant should
the risks to national security be to justify classifying a particular piece
of information?
This new framework also must include a balancing element that
takes into account the value of the particular piece of information to
public discourse. When "information . . . bear[s] on the citizenry's
ability to make informed political decisions, then a strong governmen-
tal interest is needed to offset the right of access. ' 216 Legislation should
contain a provision stipulating that classifiers must consider the First
212. See supra part I(A)(2).
213. See supra part I(B).
214. See Ballou & McSlarrow, supra note 83, at 859-67 (detailing a proposal for a
comprehensive legislative scheme).
215. Wald, supra note 27, at 764.
216. Michael J. Hayes, Note, What Ever Happened to "The Right to Know'": Ac-
cess to Government-Controlled Information Since Richmond Newspapers, 73 VA. L.
REV. 1111, 1137 (1987).
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Amendment value of the document before making their decision.
In addition, application of the legislation must be consistent to
avoid the hypocrisy of selective leaking.2 17 Congress should require the
executive branch to apply the rules in an even-handed manner so that
if no technical information that is critical of a weapons program is be-
ing leaked, then no technical information in support of the program
should be leaked. The same approach should apply to the initial classi-
fication of information. In this way, classification would be a tool for
national security, not political security.
Congress also should establish a better system of oversight. Cur-
rently, the executive branch appoints all the members of the Classifica-
tion Oversight Board, 218 but the flaw in this approach is that if the
executive branch is deliberately abusing the system, that abuse will re-
main unchecked. Congress should preserve its checking function by re-
taining control of the Board which could include members appointed
by Congress as well as the executive branch-and hopefully individuals
from outside government such as journalists-so that oversight would
no longer be monopolized by the executive branch.
Indeed, a presumption against secrecy could also result in more
effective promotion of secrecy in situations in which secrecy is genu-
inely necessary. By classifying less information and acknowledging the
need for open debate, the executive branch can more effectively pro-
tect its interests in secrecy because of the increase in the credibility of
the classification system. "[W]hen everything is classified, then nothing
is classified, and the system becomes one to be disregarded by the cyni-
cal or the careless, and to be manipulated by those intent on self-pro-
tection or self-promotion." 19
Finally, the courts should become more involved in the process.
Although the current framework assigns them the role of de novo re-
view of classification decisions,220 they have refused to take on this
function.22' A new statute should assign the courts a meaningful role in
reviewing challenges to classification decisions,222 and courts should
willingly accept that role.
217. Cf. Frederick M. Lawrence, Note, The First Amendment Right to Gather
State-Held Information, 89 YALE L.J. 923, 926-27 (1980) (discussing the theory of equal
access to both the media and the public); see supra notes 127-38 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
219. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 729 (1971) (per curiam)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
220. See supra part I(A)(2).
221. See Wald, supra note 27, at 760.
222. But cf. Ballou & McSlarrow, supra note 83, at 859-67 (detailing a proposal for
legislation that would empower a congressionally appointed agency with the authority to
validate the classification of information by the executive).
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B. Eliminating the Threat of Prosecution
At times the government must classify information and keep it se-
cret, but once secrecy breaks down and the press obtains information,
it should be free to publish without a threat of prosecution. Although
such a policy would carry some risk that critical information might be
published, that risk Would be outweighed by the First Amendment
benefits of freeing the media from the threat of prosecution. Indeed,
this approach could create incentives for the government to limit clas-
sification to situations in which it is most needed.
A prohibition on prosecuting journalists will create an additional
check on the government's tendency to overclassify by eliminating the
danger of selective prosecution. The executive branch will not have the
option of using threats to deter the press from publishing criticism.
Moreover, if the information has reached the press, it is likely to be
public information. Therefore, the compelling interest in support of se-
crecy has diminished.
2 3
Justice Potter Stewart endorsed this approach in a 1974 speech at
Yale Law School. 224 He advocated a system based on a battle between
the press and the government in which the press should be given au-
tonomy to publish whatever it can to "battle against secrecy and de-
ception in government." 225 That system would still permit the govern-
ment to keep information secret, but when they failed, journalists
could not be threatened. In this way, "[t]he Constitution . . . estab-
lishes the contest, not its resolution.
'226
Alexander Bickel advocated this same solution in his 1975 book,
The Morality of Consent.227 He paralleled the resolution of the First
Amendment versus national security conflict with the criminal process
in which the prosecuting and defense attorneys work in an adversarial
relationship to achieve justice. He reasoned that since society has a
vested interest in both good government and an active press, an active
conflict between the two is the optimal solution. Bickel acknowledged
that, as most would agree, this resolution is disorderly, but he con-
cluded: "The best resolution of this contest lies in an untidy accommo-
dation; like democracy, in Churchill's aphorism, it is the worst possible
solution, except for all the other ones. "228
223. See supra part II(B)(2).
224. Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975).
225. Id. at 636.
226. Id.
227. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 87 (1975).
228. Id. at 87.
[Vol. 43
34
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol43/iss3/6
NATIONAL SECURITY
V. CONCLUSION
The First Amendment and national security are not part of a
"zero-sum game."22 Enhancing one value does not necessarily hinder
the other. In our democracy the goal should be to place as much infor-
mation as possible in the public domain, and secrecy should be utilized
only when it facilitates government responsiveness to the people. Un-
fortunately, the current system assumes that increasing the- media's
right to publish national security information puts our national sur-
vival in jeopardy. By increasing media access to information and elimi-
nating the possibility of prosecuting journalists, the advantages of pub-
lic debate can be maximized and ultimately better decisionmaking and
better national security will result.
229. Emerson, supra note 109, at 111.
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